In a nuanced and thoughtful piece, Philip Zelikow judges:
We are in an exceptionally volatile, dynamic, and unstable period of world history.
Indeed. And yet, the tendency is for analysts to mix empty platitudes with unearned certainties. Conflict as content, triviality prevails. Faced with a troubling array of possible futures, grimly marching towards November, there is a need to escape social media circularity, and instead move outwards in thought. With that in mind, some points and provocations.
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To speak of a ‘rules-based order’ is to acknowledge its absence.
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Carl von Clausewitz in On War:
… absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.
War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end…
Does it seem like war is being treated seriously? Is it a game worth chancing? How many recent examples are there of force being used effectively, delivering the outcomes desired and leaving the actor in a stronger position?
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When considering the current state of play in international politics, does invoking the term ‘axis’ help or hinder comprehension?
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A common trope is ‘beware the fascists’: over-learning from the failure to stop the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. Yet history’s knife can cut many ways. Hitler’s advance, both domestically and internationally, was also aided by a belief that Communism was the greater threat to be guarded against. Consider Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 3 (pp 435-6):
Anti-Communism was a powerful emotion in this period, clouding instrumental reasoning.
The Bolshevik nightmare still terrified much of the West, forcing them into ideologically driven geopolitics.
Applying this to our present, what threats might we be misjudging or mispricing?
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Staying with the 1930s, reflecting on the Manchurian Crisis, in The Lights that Failed (p708, 750), Zara Steiner observed:
These events… revealed … weaknesses in the international structure that had been created during the 1920s that called into question some of the fundamental principles on which it was based.
The Japanese actions were seen not only as a challenge to the Nine Power treaty but to the Covenant of the League and to the Kellogg–Briand pact as well. The League’s ‘failure’ in Manchuria administered a blow to the Geneva system.
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria would prove to be an important juncture in the subsequent collapse of international cooperation as manifested through the League of Nations. Is this experience relevant for today? In future histories, might the conflicts in Ukraine and/or Gaza be read in a similar light? How fares the United Nations?
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Mike Davis writing in 2022:
We are living through the nightmare edition of ‘Great Men Make History’. Unlike the high Cold War when politburos, parliaments, presidential cabinets and general staffs to some extent countervailed megalomania at the top, there are few safety switches between today’s maximum leaders and Armageddon. Never has so much fused economic, mediatic and military power been put into so few hands.
These conditions certainly persist, perhaps they have worsened. Regardless, the full absurdity of such an imbalance is under-appreciated.
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Thucydides spoke of fear, honour, and greed; Hobbes of safety, reputation, and gain. It is important not to forget ressentiment, which falls under honour / reputation.
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As for the 2024 US elections, the less said the better, but recall Agent Cooper from Twin Peaks:
All things considered, being shot is not as bad as I always thought it might be, as long as you can keep the fear from your mind. But I guess you could say that about most anything in life: It’s not so bad as long as you can keep the fear from your mind.
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Remember Robert Musil’s conclusion: ‘pseudorealities lead to war.’